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assessing the supremacy of statutory language or legislative will or whether
to construe a statute contrary to its words in light of the overall purpose of
that statue. In other words, the outcome of a judicial case may depend on
whether the judge is willing to defer to the legislature, to plug certain
perceived loopholes in a statute, or even to attempt purposive interpretation
seemingly contradicting the statutory language. In this piece, I will review
the roles and responsibilities of the Korean judiciary with a focus on the
relationship between the legislature and courts. Towards this end, I will
first discuss the Korean Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on statutory
interpretation. Such introduction will be followed by a discussion on some
of the key Court decisions on the relationship between the two branches of
government.

I.

INTRODUCTION

It gives me tremendous honor and joy to present a speech at
this honorable conference. Not unlike other free democratic states,
the Republic of Korea is organized into three branches of the
government. While the administrative branch is headed by an elected
president, the National Assembly represents the legislative branch
and the courts embody the judicial branch. This separation of powers
prevents a concentration of public authority through a system of
check and balance, while assuring the freedom and constitutional
rights of the general public. Against this constitutional backdrop, it
is important to assess how the legislative and administrative branch
affect the judiciary in each court case and vice versa.
The precedents of courts have an important bearing on the
process of legislation. As court precedents build up, they crystallize
into jurisprudence, which then may find inroads into legislation.
Conversely, new pieces of legislation may be introduced to rectify
what is perceptibly wrong with the judge-made law.
Meanwhile, the relationship between legislation and case law
is a highly important subject in the Korean Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. Such relationship, first and foremost, is relevant to
statutory interpretation. The outcome of statutory interpretation is
usually contingent upon how the judges understand and construct
statute, a creature of the legislative body. Judges may differ in their
approaches to assessing the supremacy of statutory language or
legislative will, or whether to construe a statute contrary to its words
in light of the overall purpose of that statute. In other words, the
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outcome of a judicial case may depend on whether the judge is willing
to defer to the legislature or to plug certain perceived loopholes in a
statute or even to attempt purposive interpretation seemingly
contradicting statutory language. Furthermore, judicial (in)activism
remains an important subject of debate in the realm of judicial
philosophy.
In this piece, I will attempt to review the roles and
responsibilities of the Korean judiciary with a focus on the
relationship between the legislature and courts. Towards this end, I
will first discuss the Korean Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
statutory interpretation. Such introduction will be followed by a
discussion on some of the key Court decisions on the relationship
between the two branches of government. I then look forward to
hearing from today’s participating luminaries.

Ⅱ. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE AND
JUDICIARY THROUGH THE PRISM OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION

The courts’ primary role is to interpret and apply the law. In
relation to this function, different conclusions may be arrived at
depending on how the relationship between the legislature and the
judiciary is assessed. Such assessment entails a probe into germane
Korean jurisprudence. Of particular interest here is how Korean
courts have weighed statutory language against the element of
legislative intent or purpose in the context of statutory interpretation.1
Statutory words provide a fertile starting point for statutory
interpretation.2 As a matter of principle, the court’s role is to interpret a statute
according to its text. In carrying out such textual interpretation, it is important to
ascertain a possible meaning of the underlying text (möglicher Wortsinn) as well
as what meaning the text conveys in the overall context of the statute. In the vast
majority of relatively noncontroversial cases, the precedents of Korea are centered
on textual or literary interpretation.3
1

This Part is a summary of Kim Jae Hyung (김재형), Hwang-geumdeulnyeok-ui
Aleumdaum: Beobhaeseog-ui Han Danmyeon (법학평론) [Splendor of Autumn Fields of Gold:
an Aspect of Legal Interpretation], 1 BEOBHAK PYOUNGRON [SNU L. REV.] 223–229 (2010).
2 As the expression “(t)he text . . . remains the alpha and omega of interpretation”
demonstrates, the weight and importance of text are often emphasized in all types of
interpretation including statutory interpretation. See Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 106, 106 (Amy Gutmann eds., 1998).
3 See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 93Da52808, Aug. 12, 1994 (S. Kor.).
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Interestingly, there are instances where, especially in the
context of Supreme Court en banc judgments, dissenting justices
criticized the majority as derogating from the usual rite of textual
interpretation. For instance, the dissenting opinion in 95Da3666
noted that where the plain meaning of statutory language is
unambiguous, attempting to otherwise widen or narrow such meaning
is unwarranted unless there is a compelling need for purposive or
teleological judicial interpretation of the same language. 4 The
majority’s judgement in this case was considered by the dissenting
opinion to be ultra vires and tantamount to re-legislating the statue at
issue.
Also, the dissenting opinion in 2004Su42 criticized the
majority for having in effect arbitrarily altered what the minority
viewed as the reasonably plain meaning of Article 120 of the Family
Register Act.5 This opinion will be dealt with in more detail below.6
Moreover, in 94Moe32, a case involving the Korean Criminal Code,
the dissenting judges pointed out that what underpins judicial
interpretation of the criminal law is textual interpretation;
accordingly, interpreting the Criminal Code in a way that exceeds the
possible plain meaning of the Code amounts to an act of newly
creating or re-legislating the penal enactment. 7 These minority
opinions point toward the flimsiness of boundaries between statutory
interpretation and legislation.
Yet in a case where textual interpretation is found wanting,
the adjudicating court may go on to consider the intent of the
legislature and the purpose of the statute being scrutinized.8 In fact,
on many occasions, the Court took on statutory interpretation by
considering not only the legal text, but also the legislative intent and
purpose of the enactment involved. 9 For instance, the minority
4

Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 95Da36466, Apr. 23, 1998 (S. Kor.).
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2004Su42, June 22, 2006 (S. Kor.).
6 See infra Part III.B.
7 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 94Moe32, Dec. 20, 1994 (S. Kor.). For an interesting debate on
interpretation of the criminal law in the aftermath of this decision, see SHIN DONG WOON (신동운) ET
AL., BEOBLYULHAESEOG-UI HANGYE (법률해석의 한계) [The Limits of Statutory Interpretation]
(2000).
8 The legislative intent here refers to that which is revealed during the process of
legislation. When it comes to statutory interpretation, the legislator’s subjective intent is not
as important as in the context of interpreting contracts. See generally KARL LARENZ,
METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [Methodology of Jurisprudence] 328 (6th ed.
1991).
9 See e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 96Da54195, Apr. 22, 1997 (S. Kor.).
5
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opinion in 2006Doe4549 noted that interpretation of a criminal
statute involves a process of clarifying the normative meaning of the
statute for its application to a specific set of facts.10 The process of
interpretation starts from ascertaining the linguistic meaning and
content of the statutory provision being probed (textual interpretation)
while at the same time, interpreting with logical consistencies in light
of other related enactments (logical interpretation). Yet where
following the text or underlying logic of a statute is insufficient to
catch on the normative meaning of statutory language, the court
should go on to consider, inter alia, legislative history, legislative
intent and purpose, and function of the criminal provision in question
(teleological interpretation). Albeit a minority opinion, it gracefully
illustrates the method of statutory interpretation consistently adopted
by the Court.
In cases where the text of a statute and its legislative intent or
purpose collide, the question then becomes whether the court should
prioritize the text itself or the intent or purpose meant by the
legislature. A corollary to this issue is when, if ever, the court may
interpret a statute contrary to its text. This has been the subject of
ongoing scholarly and judicial debates for decades.
To start off, textualism requires a judge to duly adhere to the
statutory text, and there is virtually no exception to this school of
statutory construction. For instance, the late justice Scalia, a
renowned textualist, asserted that a statute must be interpreted
according to its text as there is no realistic means of fathoming the
legislative intent behind it.11 Textualism is apparently at odds with
intentionalism or purposivism. Under these theories, a statute is
constructed in light of its legislative intent or statutory purpose, as the
case may be. 12 Under either theory, statutory interpretation that
exceeds or contradicts the statutory text may be contemplated.
Ronald Dworkin asserted that hard cases or “those cases in which the
result is not clearly dictated by statute or precedent”13 should be tried
according to the principle of law.14 He further espoused constructive
10

Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2006Doe4549, Nov. 16, 2006 (S. Kor.).
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23–25 (Amy Gutmann eds., 1998).
12 For a discussion on intentionalism and purposivism in the American context, see
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2006). See
also KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS (1999).
13 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARVARD L. REV. 1057 (1975).
14 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 84 (1977).
11
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interpretation as a mode of statutory interpretation.15 This model of
interpretation permits the best possible interpretation of a statute by
considering related principles of law at the time of construction,
which in turn leaves “headroom” for a mode of statutory
interpretation that seemingly contradicts the legal text.
In Korea, there is a theory of law that statutory interpretation
should generally proceed in the order of statutory text, legislative
intent and statutory purpose. 16 Yet determining if the legislative
intent should precede the statutory purpose or vice versa in a given
court case is far from easy. Codified law is expressed in words. The
legislature’s intent is reflected through the text of a statute, and such
intent may not include what is on the subjective mind of responsible
legislators. Granted, there may be cases where, due to linguistic
barriers, ascertaining the meaning of statutory text is not feasible
without knowing the legislative intent behind it. Considering the
intent of the legislative body in such a case may be a commendable
step towards understanding the meaning of the text. However,
instructing the general public to self-study the subjective intent or
opinion of the lawmaker, which may not be readily discernable from
a plain reading of the text itself, and to act based on such selfknowledge, is akin to a recipe for disaster. Moreover, the purpose of
a statute plays an important role in statutory interpretation. More
often than not, skilled statutory interpretation is unattainable without
probing the purpose of statute. In fact, interpreting the meaning of a
statute by examining its legal raison d’être is fairly commonplace.
Even where a court case refers to some legislative intent, such
reference is usually directed to the objective purpose of the statute
before the court, rather than any state of mind on the part of the
lawmaker. Accordingly, statutory interpretation starts with the text;
as an exception to this practice, there may be cases where the
legislative intent or purpose may be considered as deemed
appropriate.
In the meanwhile, it may be necessary to distinguish praeter legem
from contra legem. The technique of praeter legem or statutory
interpretation beyond the text is put to use where there is a legal lacuna
or defect in a legislation, to make up for such an inherent gap or flaw.
15 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 55 (1986). See also ANDREI MARMOR,
INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 36 (1992).
16 See SHIM HUN SUB (심헌섭), BUNSEOGGWA BIPAN-UI BEOBCHULHAG (분석과 비판의
법철학) [Legal Philosophy of Analysis and Criticism] 217 (2001).
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It is exemplified by analogy or analogical interpretation. By contrast,
contra legem refers to a method of statutory interpretation that contradicts
the literal meaning of the statutory text. As one can conjecture, while
praeter legem is exercised relatively frequently, contra legem is attempted
and acknowledged only in limited circumstances.
The Korean Court has held that praeter legem may be envisaged
where textual or logical interpretation of the civil law alone is
insufficient to resolve a real-life dispute.17 In such a case, analogical
statutory interpretation may be employed instead to resolve the
dispute in conformity with the notion of social justice and to
eventually arrive at an equitable outcome. There is also a decision
recognizing the possibility of contra legem where textual interpretation
of a statute would have led to a rather unconscionable result.18 In this
regard, the Court noted in another case that where a piece of
legislation fails to keep up with social changes, the court’s role is not
merely to ask the legislature to revise or update the law and then wait
for ensuing legislative follow-ups, but to try out a reasonably
innovative method of statutory application to avoid an absurd
outcome that could have arisen from customary, textual construction
of the black letter law.19 Needless to say, any attempt at contra legem
should be considered a rare exception, rather than the prevailing norm.
Where textual interpretation of a statute is likely to generate
an outcome that flies in the face of the Constitution, the court may
consider and adopt constitutionally compliant statutory interpretation,
even though it may belie the statutory text.20 The court may also
attempt contra legem using the basic principles of law. Yet caution
should be taken here regarding routine acts of interpretation beyond
the legal text simply because rationality or morality dictates so under
the circumstances. Otherwise, the law may well lose its reason for
being. Whether the law should consider any fabric of morality or
reason and, if so, what should be considered moral or reasonable
under a particular enactment, is better left to the legislature. The
17

Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 93Da52808, Aug. 12, 1994 (S. Kor.).
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 98Da9038, Dec. 10, 1999 (S. Kor.).
19 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 95Da36466, Apr. 23, 1998 (S. Kor.).
20 In Korea, aside from the Supreme Court, which is the highest level of court, there is
a separate constitutional court. HUNBEOB [CONSTITUTION] art. 101.2 (S. Kor.). The Korean
Constitutional Court is empowered to review the constitutionality of various legislations.
HUNBEOB [CONSTITUTION] art. 111.1 (S. Kor.). The Court is not empowered to determine the
constitutionality of court judgements, which largely distinguishes the Korean constitutional
court system from the German counterpart.
18
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lawmaker’s will or resolve may well be denigrated if a court were to
hand down a decision squarely refuting the statutory text before it
based on the court’s own moral compass.21 Any attempt at justifying
contra legem on the basis of morality or rationality, therefore, should
be taken with a grain of salt.

Ⅲ. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE AND JUDICIARY
AS REFLECTED IN THE KEY COURT JUDGEMENTS
A.

Objective of Statutory Interpretation: A Balance between
Legal Certainty and Case-specific Correctness

The Supreme Court decision of 2006Da81035 is about the
meaning of tenant under the Rental Housing Act of Korea (“RHA”).22
In this case, the Court addressed what forms the primary objective of
statutory interpretation and related standards of interpretation. The
plaintiff in this case, the Korea National Housing Corporation, leased
an apartment to defendant A under the RHA. The rental contract was
signed off by defendant A under her own name. In fact, however,
defendant B, defendant A’s father, had asked his daughter to enter
into the rental contract on his behalf. The security deposit came from
defendant B, and the actual tenant of the leased apartment was also
defendant B, not his daughter.
Under the RHA, after five years of a mandatory lease period,
a tenant is entitled to purchase the rental property on a priority basis,
provided the tenant is not the owner of another house or apartment
from the onset of tenancy until the time of purchase. At the end of
the lease, however, since defendant 1 already owned another house,
she was not entitled to such priority purchase. And neither was
defendant 2 entitled as he was not party to the original lease contract,
and therefore not an eligible tenant. Following the expiry of the rental
contract, the plaintiff sued both defendants for eviction and
repossession of property.
In relation to who is a tenant under the RHA, the appellate
court and the Supreme Court reached polar opposite conclusions.
This difference in outcome may be attributed to dissonant judicial
views on the nature of relationship between the judiciary and the
21

This does not mean that the meaning of statutory text ought to be interpreted
according to the legislator’s intent.
22 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2006Da81035, Apr. 23, 2009 (S. Kor.).
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legislature. The appellate court rejected the plaintiff’s request for an
eviction order in the middle of a freezing winter, which then received
media coverage as a “heartwarming decision of a beautiful judicial
mind”. 23 The appellate court noted that, considering the policy
objectives of the RHA, limiting the scope of tenant under the RCA to
a tenant whose name and signature is on the lease would be a typical
example of textual, formalistic statutory interpretation gone
overboard. Considering the extenuating circumstances of defendant
2 here, the court considered him to be a tenant under the RHA for all
intents and purposes. As such, defendant 2 was entitled to a priority
purchase right under the RHA, and the remedies sought by the
plaintiff were accordingly denied.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, vacated the appellate
court decision and remanded it. In so doing, the highest court noted
that since the law embodies universal norms binding affected
members of the public without discrimination, a court’s legal
interpretation should be a search for the objective meaning of the text
involved and for legal certainty to ensure consistencies in
interpretation. At the same time, statutory interpretation should
proceed in a way that aims to provide the most apt solution to a set of
facts before the adjudicating court. Accordingly, the Court held, the
primary objective of statutory interpretation should be a pursuit of
individual correctness within the overriding boundaries of legal
certainty.
In this process, textual interpretation that identifies and
construes to the extent possible the ordinary meaning of the statutory
text should be a guiding norm. In addition, the legislative intent and
purpose of the statute, its legislative chronology, and relationship to
other pertinent enactments may be considered as part of a systematic
and logical approach to statutory interpretation. Especially where the
text of a statute consists of relatively unambiguous notions and
terminologies, the court should not hesitate to employ textual
interpretation for resolution of the case at hand.
In this case, the Court clarified that the aim of statutory
interpretation is to achieve case-specific correctness without
23

For a detailed analysis of the appellate judgement, see Kim Jae Hyung, supra note 1,
at 200. This publication was originally prepared as a research paper on the appellate case at the
request of a Supreme Court research judge and submitted to the Court in 2008. The
2006Da81035 Court subsequently followed the same line of reasoning as laid out in the paper,
which got published in 2010.
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undermining legal certainty. Towards this end, textual interpretation
should be considered a primary tool with possible consideration of
other pertinent elements including the intent of the lawmaker. In this
case, the RHA was devoid of a specific interpretive provision on the
meaning of tenant thereunder. Accordingly, the Court took the liberty
of construing the ordinary meaning of tenant according to how it is
understood under the Civil Code24 as guided by general social norms.
Under Article 618 of the Civil Code, a tenant denotes someone who
has entered into a lease contract with the landlord. Under this type of
contract, the tenant is given a bundle of rights including the right to
quiet enjoyment of the rental property in consideration of the tenant’s
payment of rents. A de facto user or beneficiary of the property or
the actual payor of the initial deposit or rents, fails to qualify as a
tenant. This is what possibly prompted the Court to vacate the
appellate decision.
B. Judicial Response to Social Changes: Filling-in of Legislative
Vacuums through Case Law
Korea lacks express statutory provisions on how to implement
the sex reassignment of a transgender person administratively. Under
Korea’s family registry system, a person’s gender is recorded at the
time of birth. When the same person undergoes a sex reassignment
process later on, there is no administrative procedure to follow to
modify the gender section on the family registry. Despite this status
quo, in a recent en banc judgment, the Court granted sex
reassignment of a transgender so that entries on the family registry
may be revised to match the reassigned gender.
In the Korean Court decision of 2004Su42, the majority
determined that sex reassignment of a transgender is feasible through
statutory interpretation, while the dissenting judges opposed that
determination.25 The concurring opinions supported the majority by
espousing the notion of constitutional statutory interpretation. This
seminal case exemplifies divergent views among the Court justices
on the relationship between the legislature and the courts.
24 Minbeob [Civil Code], Act No. 471, Feb. 22, 1958, amended by Act No. 14965, Oct.
31, 2017 (S. Kor.).
25 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2004Su42, June 22, 2006 (S. Kor.).
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The applicant in this case was born a female in 1951 and
registered so on her family registry. While growing up, however, the
applicant exhibited masculine temperament and physical traits. In
1992, the applicant underwent successful sex change surgeries to
obtain male sex organs and received ongoing hormone treatments
thereafter. As a result, the applicant acquired masculine body traits
as well as the firm gender identity of a man. The court of first
instance and the appellate court both rejected the applicant’s request
to change the gender information on the family register citing a lack
of statutory grounds to grant such a request. The Korean Court,
however, vacated and remanded the decision below.
The Court noted that, judging by social norms, the applicant
could be clearly evaluated a male. This is because the applicant was
an unmarried person with no child who had acquired male sex organs
and physical features as a result of previous surgeries. Also,
considering the applicant’s strong gender identity as that of a man,
which had built up over the course of adolescence and adulthood,
there was little likelihood of the applicant reverting back to the
original gender. Moreover, the applicant was recognized as a male
both in personal and social spheres.
But when it came to whether the sex reassignment of a
transgender is administratively possible, the justices were divided.
The majority acknowledged such possibility in the affirmative. They
noted that Article 120 of the Family Register Act (currently Article
104 of the Act on the Registration, etc. of Family Relationships)
(“FRA”) provides for procedures to follow when correcting or
modifying entries on the family register. This provision, they held,
is applicable when changing the gender of a genuine transgender on
the Register to conform to the reassigned gender.
In the majority’s view, a transgender is someone whose
gender at birth is different from the legally evaluated gender at the
time of applying for a correction to the family register. Since, as
members of the public, transgender persons have the right to pursue
happiness and enjoy life as decent human beings, such request should
be granted unless it is contrary to maintenance of the public order or
welfare.
The majority held that the purpose of Article 120 of the FRA
is to enable an applicant to correct the family registry when certain
registry entries are inappropriate or do not match the applicant’s
current vital status. In light of this legislative aim, when it is verified
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that the applicant is a genuine transgender, it would be rational to
permit the application to go through so that the family registry can
duly reflect the applicant’s newly acquired gender.
Two justices of the Court dissented. In their opinion, the
purpose of FRA Article 120 is to remedy what was erroneously
recorded on the family register at the time of birth report due to a
clerical mistake or an error. Accordingly, if the family register
truthfully matches an applicant’s vital status and related entries at the
time of birth report, subsequent changes including any gender
reassignment may not provide grounds for invoking FRA Article 120
to correct the family register. The statutory text of FRA Article 120
is so unambiguous that any different construction is simply
unwarranted. The majority opinion was therefore criticized for going
beyond the outer limits of legitimate analogical interpretation.
According to the dissenting judges, the Court’s proper role was to
acknowledge the absence of legal grounds to change the gender
section of the family register in such a case as the present one and to
urge the legislature to create a new enactment or to amend the FRA
Article 120 regime in due time, to duly address the current
controversy.
The concurring opinion supported the majority along the line
of constitutional statutory interpretation. Namely, transsexual
persons are exposed to a peculiar situation whereby their biological
gender at birth does not match the gender they get to confirm while
growing up and into adulthood. Given this peculiarity, correcting a
transsexual’s gender should be within the ambit of Article 120 of the
FRA. Of course, enacting a new legislation to provide for such
correction process would be most ideal. But in the absence of an
existing legislative framework, the court should grant administrative
correction of a qualified transsexual on a case-specific basis by
recourse to constitutional statutory interpretation. In this regard,
leaving transsexuals forlorn without a viable remedy would be
unconstitutional.
This decision is a landmark. 2004Su42 put forward the
following three pre-conditions to correct a transsexual’s gender. 26
First, there must be a medical diagnosis of transsexualism the
symptoms of which remain unalleviated and continue. 27 This should
26
27

Id.
Id.
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be accompanied by the affected individual’s mental and social
adjustive migration toward the opposite sex. Second, there must be
gender reassignment surgery to enable the patient to acquire the
sexual characteristics of the opposite sex28. Third, judging by general
social norms, the transsexual must be seen as equipped with traits of
the opposite gender, which then leads to normatively permissible
correction of gender information. 29
Not unlike Korea, Germany did not permit the gender
correction of transsexuals until the German Federal Constitutional
Court’s decision in 1978.30 Unlike Korea, though, Germany enacted a
statute called the Transsexuals Act in 1980.31 This legislation regulates the
pre-conditions and effects of gender change in detail. For instance, the
German legislation requires that an applicant for gender change be
unmarried.32 If the applicant is married, then (s)he should get a divorce
before the gender change is approved.33 Whether the applicant has any
child in or out of wedlock is not relevant to the review process.34 This is
because the legal effects of gender reassignment are not retroactive in
nature.35 As a result, it does not affect or alter legal relations surrounding
the transsexual’s child). 36 Once the court approves gender change, the

28

Id.
Id.
30 BVERFGE, 1 BvR 16/72, Oct. 11, 1978. FCC held here that, seen from recognized
fundamental rights pertaining to human dignity and freedom of expression, if the petitioner
exhibited the symptoms of medically irreversible transsexualism and has consequently
undergone sex change surgeries, the gender on his birth certificate should be accordingly
modified. If such surgeries were medically proper, then the modification would not be
contrary to public policy. It was noted that, in the absence of specific statutory grounds, FCC
still owes a constitutional obligation to correct gender information on the petitioner’s birth
certificate.
31 The official German title of this enactment is Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen
und die Feststellung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen.
32 See
Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung
der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen [Transsexuellengesetz].
[German Transsexuals Act] (promulgated on Sept. 10, 1980, effective on Jan. 1, 1981), art.
8.1.2, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1 at 56, 1656.
33 Rainer Frank, Europe, Teughi Dok-il-eseo Seongbyeol-ui Byeongyeong (유럽, 특히
독일에서 성별의 변경) [Gender Change in Europe, Particularly in the Context of Germany],
1 SEOUL DAEHAKGYO BEOBHAK (서울대학교 法學) [SEOUL L.J.] 283, 291 (Kim Jae Hyung
trans., 2006). This piece was presented at a comparative law conference organized by the
Korean Supreme Court in September 2005, before the handing down of 2004Su42.
34 Frank, supra note 33, at 291.
35 Id.
36 See Gesetz
über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung
der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen [Transsexuellengesetz].
29
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rights and obligations of the applicant transsexual are determined in
accordance with the reassigned gender.37
Korea has yet to have a similar enactment. It is therefore
unclear under what conditions an application for gender change can
be approved in the context of family register. It is speculated that
since Korea currently prohibits same-sex marriage, the applicant
should get a divorce before his or her application is granted. Whether
the applicant has a minor child may be a factor in the review process;
such fact, however, need not be an absolute bar to the application. In
Korea, all these issues are being formulated and addressed through
court precedents, as opposed to enactment.
C. Judicial Influences on the Legislature: a Court Holding
Prompting Enactment of a Statute
The Korean Supreme Court decision of 2009Da17417 was a
highly controversial case involving the suspension of life support for
an old woman named Madame Kim.38 The plaintiff Kim fell into a
persistent vegetative state while treated at a hospital run by the
defendant (Yonsei University). Medical tests on the plaintiff revealed
that her brain was in a serious state of shrinkage. The plaintiff’s
attending doctor gave the opinion that while she was incapable of
voluntary control of breathing, the plaintiff was yet to be braindead
with less than five chance of regaining consciousness. But other
specialists who had examined her medical records noted that the
plaintiff was in an ongoing state of coma and as good as braindead
with little chances of recovery.
The plaintiff, a devout Christian, was dependent on a ventilator
for survival. While she was healthy and conscious, the plaintiff
expressed her desire not to burden anyone for protracted medical care
or assistance to her. She also expressed her wish not to depend on
life support in a fatal medical emergency.
The plaintiff requested that the defendant stop further lifeprolonging treatment. The Court accepted that request. The
[German Transsexuals Act] (promulgated on Sept. 10, 1980, effective on Jan. 1, 1981), art.
11, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1 at 56, 1656.
37 See Gesetz
über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung
der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen [Transsexuellengesetz].
[German Transsexuals Act] (promulgated on Sept. 10, 1980, effective on Jan. 1, 1981), art.
10, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1 at 56, 1656.
38 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da17417, May. 21, 2009 (S. Kor.).
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2009Da17417 court noted that while recognizing a patient’s right to
self-determination in the context of life-prolonging treatment, one’s
right to life is precious and is quintessential to all fundamental
rights.39 As such, whether to stop any medical treatment that bears
on a patient’s life requires an extremely cautious decision. The Court
was divided on what constitutes the threshold for allowing lifeprolonging treatment to be suspended.40 According to the majority,
the threshold is met where: (i) the patient has reached the irreparable
phase of death; and (ii) the patient has previously communicated his
or her intent that life-prolonging treatment be suspended.41
In relation to the first element, the irreparable phase of death
is reached when there is no likelihood for the patient to regain
consciousness and to recover the loss of vital signs; it must be clear
that the patient may die within a short period without life support.42
In relation to the second element, if the patient had expressly
communicated his or her intent that life-prolonging treatment be
suspended when reaching the irreparable phase of death, such
communicated intent would be honored and followed through.43 The
problem arises when there is no such patient communication. In that
instance, according to the majority, the patient’s consent may be
presumed when it becomes objectively apparent that suspending lifeprolonging treatment would be in the patient’s best interests.44 In this
regard, what is critical is if, in light of the patient’s usual values and
belief system while conscious, the patient would have consented to
the suspension of life-prolonging treatment, had (s)he been given a
chance to provide informed consent. Making such a presumption on
behalf of the patient would not be contrary to common sense nor to
social norms.45
If there is any evidence pointing to a terminally-ill patient’s
intent, be it express or implied, to refuse or stop life-prolonging

39 Id. Article 10 of the Korean Constitution guarantees all citizens’ human worth and
dignity. HUNBEOB [CONSTITUTION] art. 10 (S. Kor.). One’s right to life is arguably derived
from this constitutional provision. See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Da37524, 37530, Jan.
22, 2002 (S. Kor.).
40 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da17417, May. 21, 2009 (S. Kor.).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
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treatment, the court may order the treatment to be suspended.46 In the
absence of leading evidence, the minority noted, suspension of
medical treatment may still be justified from the standpoint of legal
order in general.47 For instance, the medical institution responsible
for the patient’s treatment may be obliged to suspend further lifeprolonging treatment as part of its implied obligations under the
underlying treatment contract.
In relation to whether suspension of life-prolonging treatment
is permitted, there was no applicable legislation at the time of this
case. Despite this status quo, the Court answered in the affirmative
by putting certain legal theories to use. As noted above, the
2009Da17417 court drew the conclusion that life-prolonging
treatment may be suspended in accordance with the patient’s right to
self-determination. In the process, the Court also applied civil law
theories relating to interpretation of juristic acts or of expressions in
formulating the pre-requisites for suspension of treatment. Following
2009Da17417, the legislature has recently enacted a statute on lifeprolonging treatment.48 This can be considered an instance where the
judiciary nudged the legislature into action.
D. Complimentary Relations between the Legislative and Judiciary
What was the main issue in 2008Da45828, another en banc
Court judgement, was a matter of interpretation involving who should
be party to a bank deposit contract under Korea’s real-name financial
system. 49 On February 13, 2006, the plaintiff’s husband (“A”)
opened a new fixed term account (“Account”) with a commercial
bank (“B”) on the plaintiff’s behalf. A deposited KRW 42 million to
the Account. On the application for the Account, both the plaintiff’s
name and resident number were entered, along with a copy of the
plaintiff’s photo identification. The bankbook of the Account was
issued in the plaintiff’s name, and B’s transactional records showed
the plaintiff as the owner of the Account.

46

Id.
Id.
48 Hoseupiseu Wanhwauilyomit Imjong-gwajeong-e Itneun Hwanjaui Yeonmyeonguilyo Gyeoljeong-e Gwanhan Beoblyul [Act on Decisions on Hospice and Palliative Care
and Decisions on Life-sustaining Treatment for Patients at the End of Life], Act No. 15542,
Mar. 27, 2018 (S. Kor.).
49 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Da45828, Mar. 19, 2009 (S. Kor.).
47
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The appellate court found an implied agreement between A
and B that A, as opposed to the plaintiff, was party to the underlying
deposit contract. The Court, on the other hand, vacated this finding.50
In so holding, the Court made it clear that, under the real name
financial system, where a bank deposit contract is duly entered into
after real name verification of the account holder, only the account
holder is entitled to withdraw the fund deposited. This is the case
unless there is an unusual circumstance indicating the meeting of
minds both the bank and the actual depositor of fund intended the
depositor, rather than the account holder, to be party to the banking
contract. This ratio was on point and in the right direction.51
Who is party to a bank deposit contract is a matter of contract
interpretation. Especially in the context of rather voluminous and
repetitive financial transactions such as banking contracts, it becomes
necessary to determine who is party to such a contract in a relatively
routine and effortless manner. In this regard, the determinative
criterion is who was objectively presented to the bank as the account
holder after a real name verification process. This process is in
conformity with Article 3.1 of the Act on Real Name Financial
Transactions and Confidentiality (“Real Name Act”). The provision
requires financial transactions to proceed on a real-name basis. What can
be inferred from this statutory requirement is that only the account holder
with a verified real name may be party to the underlying transaction and the
parties’ implied consent to such contract formation. This mutual assent then
leads to only the account holder constituting a legitimate party to the
banking contract.52
Korea first introduced a real name financial system in 1993.
In 1997, the Real Name Act was enacted. Under the enactment,
50 2008Da45828 consists of the majority opinion, a separate concurring opinion, and two
supporting opinions.
51 For academic views in support of 2008Da45828, see Oh Young Joon (오영준), Geumyungsilmyeongjeha-eseo Yegeumgyeyag-ui Dangsaja Hwagjeong bangbeob [How to determine the
parties to the deposit agreement under the real-name financial system], 8 SABEOB (사법)
[JURIS], 265 (2009). See also Sohn Chul Woo (손철우), Geum-yungsilmyeongjewa
Yegeumju Hwagjeong (금융실명제와 예금주 확정) [Real Name Financial System and
Determination of the Account Holder], MINSAPANRAEYEONGU (XXXII) (민사판례연구
(XXXII)) [STU. OF CIV. CASES (XXXII)] 155 (2010).
52 Kim Jae Hyung (김재형), GEUM-YUNG-GEOLAEUI DANGSAJA-E GWANHAN PANDANGIJUN
(금융거래의 당사자에 관한 판단기준) [CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE PARTIES TO FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS], MINBEOBRON (III) (민법론 (III)) [CIV. L. THEORIES (III)] 70 (2007). This piece
was presented at the 55th comparative law seminar hosted by the Korean Supreme Court in
May 2006.
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financial transactions ought to proceed on a real name basis.
Adoption of a real name financial system and subsequent enactment
of the Real Name Act has affected related court cases. Before
2008Da45828, the Court was willing to recognize the scope of
account holder to include any actual depositor of the fund deposited,
even if the full name of the account holder differed from that of the
depositor. 53 But, since 2008Da45828, the Court has drastically
narrowed this, so that in Korea today, only the account holder is
considered party to the banking contract, in the absence of very
special circumstances. The Court’s jurisprudence has greatly
contributed to increased transparency of financial transactions in
general.
Legislation can affect the contours of jurisprudence; yet the
practical extent of such influence is largely up to the courts to fathom
and apply. The enactment of the Real Name Act did not provide
concrete guidelines for determining who is party to a banking contract.
It was up to the judiciary and legal academics to deliberate on and
produce germane guidelines. In this case, the Court succeed in
resolving what remained an outstanding issue under the Act based on
its scrutiny of how the Act defines the parties to a bank deposit
contract. 2008Da45828 thus illustrates how the legislature and
judiciary complement each other in practice.
E. The Impacts of Case Law on Social Changes
2015Da200111 is a recent landmark Korean Court case.54 It
has generated prompt and fiery reactions from the Korean legal
community and society at large. In this case, the plaintiff paid out
KRW55 100,000,000 as a success fee to his lawyer according to an
attorney contingency fee agreement in a related criminal case. The
plaintiff subsequently sued the lawyer to return the fee. The case
below found that 40 percent of the success fee (that is, KRW 40
million) was out of proportion contrary to the principle of good faith
and trust or of equity and hence null. As such, the defendant was
obligated to return KRW 40 million to the plaintiff. While dismissing
53

See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Da67031, Mar. 10, 2000 (S. Kor.). The author
called for changes to the existing line of case law. See Kim, supra note 52, at 73–77, 88.
54 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Da200111, July 23, 2015 (S. Kor.).
55 KRW refers to South Korean won (1 USD = approximately 1,130 KRW at the time
of writing).
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the defendant’s appeal, the Court unanimously found that: (i)
contingency fee agreements in criminal cases are considered contrary to
the standard of good morals and public order as encapsulated in Article
103 of the Civil Code; (ii) this finding applies to contingency fees for
criminal cases going forward; any such fee arrangements predating the
current judgement may not be deemed null per se; and (iii) the contingency
fee plan in this case predates the Court’s opinion; as such, it cannot be
readily adjudged that the plan is null ab initio as contrary to Article 103.
But, the decision of the case below that 40 percent of the success fee is
excessive and hence void was upheld.
a.

Are contingency fees in criminal cases against public policy
and therefore void?

2015Da200111 is a highly meaningful precedent in light of
its declaration that contingency fees for criminal cases are null as
contravening social order and that this ratio is only effective going
forward and not retroactively. An attorney’s contingency fee regime
in a criminal case refers to a financial arrangement whereby the client
agrees to pay special fees to the attorney depending on the outcome
of the case or on an agreed rate of success. The issue here is whether
to acknowledge the fee regime’s legal effects under freedom of
contract or deny them as contrary to public policy or the overarching
principle of good faith and trust.
Academics have exhibited a whole spectrum of opinions
ranging from the view that the contingency fee arrangement is valid
as an extension of freedom of contract to the assertion that
contingency fees in criminal cases are generally void. The Court
previously upheld in principle the validity of contingency fee
schemes in criminal cases, subject to the caveat that the adjudicating
court may only uphold a portion of the success fee by applying the
principle of good faith and equity. 56 2015Da200111 reversed the
prior jurisprudence by holding the illegality of criminal contingency
fees on public policy grounds. In so doing, the Court considered
whether such fee schemes are against the general morals of Korean
society or pose a risk to the public’s trust in the criminal justice
system as a whole.

56

See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da21249, July 9, 2009 (S. Kor.).
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Whether the Court’s conclusion in 2015Da200111 is
justifiable remains controversial. Lawyers and members of the
general public may well react differently. Nevertheless, this decision
is certainly not beyond the normative ambits of the Korean civil law
system. The civil law of Korea is largely based on the principle of
freedom of contract. Members of the public are thus free to engage
in civil and commercial activities of their own formulation. Under
Article 103 of the Civil Code, however, a juristic act that is contrary
to social order may be rendered null. Also, the principle of good faith
and trust, as encapsulated in Article 2 of the Civil Code, is at work to
ensure that the outcome of a given case conforms to the norms of
equity. Prior jurisprudence of the Court attempted to address the open
issue of criminal contingency fee agreements by envisaging the
possibility of reducing success fees based on the principle of good
faith and trust. The 2015Da200111 court, by contrast, nullified the
contingency fee scheme as contrary to Article 103. It is hence clear
that both judicial approaches to the same issue are anchored on
doctrinal tenets of the civil law.
b.

Did the Court err in acknowledging only the prospective
effect of changes in precedents?

2015Da200111 denied the retroactive effect of changes in
case law. Namely, the Court considered it difficult to nullify existing
contingency fee schemes under Article 103 of the Civil Code. The
controversy in 2015Da200111 could be addressed by reference to the
existing jurisprudence. Yet the Court took the further step of
overturning its own prior jurisprudence to signal the firm policydriven resolve that changes to the criminal contingency fee scheme
and related practices were in order.
c.

Post script

As can be imagined, criminal defense attorneys have
vehemently opposed 2015Da200111. They have argued that any
flaw with the contingency fee system should be resolved through
legislation, rather than any judicial pronouncement. This argument
is not without merit in that there is no statute or statutory provision
expressly dealing with the subject of contingency fees for criminal
cases. Despite this legislative vacuum, the 2015Da200111 court
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chose to make proactive use of Article 103 of the Civil Code, a
statutory provision of general application, to declare that criminal
contingency fee agreements are void as against public order.57 This,
in my opinion, exemplifies judicial activism. 58
In fact,
2015Da200111 is one of the handful of Court cases from the last
decade evincing judicial activism. The relative scarcity of these cases
makes them highly influential in shaping the judicial landscape of
Korea. Needless to say, judicial activism is neither an unswerving
principle nor a path to tread all the time. At the end of the day, what
policy stance a court is to assume in a given case would be as
important as the doctrinal issues underpinning that case.

Ⅳ. CONCLUSION
One of the Court’s primary roles is to provide uniform points
of reference for interpreting various statutes. Such role is reified
differently in different cases. While pursuing legal certainty, the
Court also attempts to achieve case-specific correctness in sync with
the ideals of justice. In this process, the legislature and judiciary may
be in complementary or strained relations with one another,
depending on the context.
The legislature and judiciary may not claim absolute
supremacy over the other. Rather, they are like two wheels of a cart
in pursuit of the common objective called justice. This symbiotic
relationship is expected to go a long way in cultivating a healthy state
and society at large.
Social changes will invariably entail new sets of problems.
Legislation may not be a panacea here. In order for the Court to
assume a visionary role in this milieu, it must be equipped with
precise understandings of the Constitution and other laws of the land
to provide timely, reasonable and often creative legal solutions.
Relying on the individual judges’ sense of equity or justice will be
only a part of the equation. The Court’s precedents will lack
persuasiveness and coherence without adequate theological
57

Id.
In support of the majority, the supporting opinion in 2015Da20011 put forward legal maxims
relating to trust in the judicial system, the public’s legal consciousness, comparative law materials, and
positive future effects of the Court’s enunciation in this case. These suggested elements are highly
unconventional in the Korean judicial system and forward-looking, which, in my opinion, are
reminiscent of judicial activism.
58
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underpinnings. In its ongoing quest for such legal acumen, the
Korean Supreme Court has greatly benefitted not only from soul
searching inside, but also from comparative studies of the noteworthy
experiences of other jurisdictions. I have no doubt that this
conference will provide a useful forum for hearing what each
attendant representing the highest court in each participating
jurisdiction, has to offer during the course of this forum and in the
future. Thank you.
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